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Tax morale and conditional cooperation
Abstract
Why so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central
question in the tax compliance literature. A homo economicus, with a more refined motivation structure,
helps us to shed light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of
conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high
correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting
endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation
between institutional quality and tax morale.
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21. Introduction
Nobody likes paying taxes. The most popular instrument to “force” people to pay their
taxes is deterrence policy. In line with the economics of crime approach, based on the expected
utility maximization calculus, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) presented a formal model, showing
that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and the
degree of punishment. However, this groundbreaking model has many shortcomings. People who
exhibit empirically observed levels of risk aversion normally pay their taxes, although there is a
low probability of getting caught and being penalized. Thus, people are more honest than
deterrence models would predict. There is a wide gap between the risk aversion that would
guarantee such a high compliance and the much lower individual risk aversion observed in
reality (see Graetz and Wilde 1985, Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1992, Frey and Feld 2002).
Tax compliance experiments also indicate that individuals report a higher level of income than
the expected utility model would predict (for an overview see Alm 1999, Torgler 2002). Many
years ago, Baldry (1987, p. 377) pointed out: “Rather than question the experimental method,
these results suggest that it is perhaps the theory which needs revision (...)” (p. 377).
Similarly, the high co-operation observed is not specific to the tax compliance literature.
Ultimatum experiments have shown that, in many of the experiments, the modal offer is (50,50),
the mean offer somewhere around (40,60), and that the smaller the offer, the higher the
probability that the offer is rejected (see Ochs and Roth 1989, Roth 1995). Public good
experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their
endowment to a public good (see, e.g., Ledyard 1995, Davis and Holt 1993).
Traditional models also have the disadvantage that they treat taxation as an isolated case.
However, recent studies indicate that subjects do not act as isolated individuals playing a “game
against nature” (see, e.g., Alm et al. 1992, Wenzel and Taylor 2004). In this paper, we emphasize
3the relevance that tax compliance takes place in a social context. The behavior of other taxpayers
is of great importance in understanding taxpayers’ compliance. As a consequence, theories on
pro-social behavior, that take the behavior of others into account, may be a promising concept.
Taxpayers are willing to pay their taxes conditionally, depending on the pro-social behavior of
other taxpayers; the more other taxpayers are perceived to be honest, the more willing
individuals are to pay their own taxes. The extent to which others also contribute triggers more
or less cooperation and systematically influences the willingness to contribute. We use survey
data to test whether “conditional cooperation” can be identified. Section 2 gives an overview of
the existing literature on social comparisons. In Section 3, we present our theoretical approach
and develop our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 finishes with
some concluding remarks.
2. Brief overview of the existing literature on pro-social behavior
Standard expected utility theory has difficulty in explaining taxation behavior well. In
contrast, there is a lack of empirical evidence in the tax compliance literature testing the effects
of social comparisons. Two studies in the 80s ran experiments to investigate social comparisons,
with mixed results. In the experiment by Spicer and Becker (1980), 57 students participated and
they were told that their own tax tables were based on a tax of 40 percent. 19 participants were
told that the average tax rate was 65 percent, a further 19 participants were told that the average
tax rate was 15 percent, and finally another 19 participants were told that all participants had the
same tax rate (truth value, 40 percent). On average, 23 percent of total taxes payable were
evaded. The group with the perceived high taxation evaded by 32 percent, the group with the
apparently low taxation evaded by 12 percent and the group with the medium taxation evaded by
25 percent. The results suggest that social comparisons are relevant. Another study uses a similar
design, altering the information about taxation: “Your tax rate is 30 percent and the average tax
4rate is x”. The variable x had the values 15 percent, 30 percent and 45 percent (see Webley,
Robben and Morris 1988). In contrast to Spicer and Becker (1980), altering the information did
not have a significant effect on tax evasion. Thus, the effect of social comparisons on tax
compliance seems unclear, according to these papers.
However, these two experiments were designed to analyze the causal relationship
between inequity and tax evasion. The design is influenced by equity theory, which points out
that satisfaction and behavior are linked not only to the objective outcome levels, but also to
outcomes received in relation to those which were judged to be fair (see Tyler and Smith 1998).
Furthermore, a lack of equity between the taxpayer’s own tax rate and the tax rate of others
causes a sense of distress. Being at a disadvantage in such a situation creates anger, whilst being
at an advantage creates feelings of guilt (see Adams 1965, Homans 1961). People will engage in
certain behavior, such as tax evasion, in an effort to restore equity. Neither study analyzes the
interaction between taxpayers.
Tax compliance experiments with a public good structure would give us a better
opportunity of analyzing social interactions within a group. Alm, Jackson and McKee (1993)
implemented various treatments in which a public good was provided. Taxes paid in one round
were multiplied by a certain factor, and the resulting amount was then redistributed in equal
shares to the members of the group. The data indicates that the average compliance is always
higher in the presence of a public good. However, the study is able to distinguish between the
effect of public goods and the effect of taxpayers’ interaction. One way to deal with this problem
would be to build an experimental design with fixed public transfers treatment, regardless of how
much taxes subjects pay, and a treatment where public transfers depend on the amount of taxes
paid, and where subjects take the others’ compliance into account (see Kim 1994).
More evidence on pro-social behavior is provided by laboratory public good experiments
(see, e.g., Croson 1998, Sonnemans, Schram and Offermann 1999, Keser and van Winden
52000).1 Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) designed an experiment that, compared to
previous studies, tried to provide a better way of checking the extent to which subjects are
conditional cooperators. Participants had to indicate their contribution to the public good for
different average levels of contributions by other group members. They found that 50 percent of
the subjects were conditionally cooperative.
In general, several theories try to explain conditional cooperation. Most of the papers
propose theories of reciprocity (for an overview, see e.g., Rabin 1998, Falk and Fehr 2002).
Adapted to the tax compliance context, this would mean that, if many citizens pay their taxes, a
taxpayer would also feel obligated to contribute and pay his/her taxes. On the other hand, if
many individuals evade taxes, a taxpayer will not feel obligated to pay his/her taxes. Another
promising concept is conformity (for an overview, see Henrich 2004). This means that the
motivation of behaving in a conditionally cooperative way may be influenced by the taxpayers’
wish to fulfill the social norm of paying their taxes and behaving according to society’s rules.
Thus, the second approach is less connected to incentives and benefits. Bardsley and Sausgruber
(2006) point out that: “a conformist would contribute to a useless public “good”, which benefits
no-one, if he observes enough others making contributions. A reciprocally motivated agent
would not, since he does not benefit from their behavior” (p. 4). Individuals want their behavior
to conform to normal behavior (Henrich 2004). Two recent laboratory studies indicate the
strength of “conformity” compared to “reciprocity” (see Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004, and
Bardsley and Sausgruber 2006). On the other hand, the study by Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter
(2003) indicates considerable support for reciprocity. They created a laboratory situation in
which each subject was a member of two economically identical groups, where only the
members varied. They observed that the same subjects contributed differently, depending on the
behavior of the group (contributing more to the group when cooperation was higher). Kurzban et
                                                 
1 Sausgruber (2003), who analyzed team spirit in an experiment, also found that subjects contribute significantly
more, the higher the average contribution within their team (excluding their own contribution).
6al. (2001) found in their experimental paper that subjects don’t want to contribute more than
other group members. Furthermore, individuals used their own contribution to elicit others’
cooperation, which corresponds to reciprocal behavior.
A further reason for cooperation can be found when charitable organizations are
observed. They have an incentive to ask donors to give approval to announce their gifts, as the
announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others’ making a contribution and thus helps
to overcome the problem of free-riding. It also sends out a signal about the quality of the public
good (see Vesterlund 2003).2
Pro-social behavior has mostly been analyzed in laboratory experiments. Thus, evidence
outside the laboratory setting is hardly available. Frey and Meier (2004a) analyzed patterns of
pro-social behavior outside the lab setting. They investigated students’ decisions regarding the
contribution to two Social Funds administered by the University of Zurich. This situation
corresponded to an n-person public good setting, involving around 33’000 persons (and a panel
set of 136’000 observations). The field observations were also supplemented with surveys. Many
students seemed to behave pro-socially. Frey and Meier found evidence of conditional
cooperation. The more individuals expected others to cooperate, the more they cooperated.
However, Frey and Meier (2004b) observed that conditional cooperation depends on past
behavior. People who never contributed in the past do not change their behavior. The strongest
reaction to the information about others’ behavior was observed with individuals who were
indifferent regarding the contribution. Surprisingly, Frey and Meier found that when students
were informed that few other students contributed to the Social Funds, they did not respond as
expected. If anything, they tended to give more, not less.
Heldt (2005) conducted a natural field experiment on conditional cooperation where
cross-country skiers in two Swedish ski resorts were faced with the decision of whether or not to
                                                 
2 However, according to Potters et al. (2001), “announcing” only has an effect when the quality of the public good is
not common knowledge.
7contribute to ski track funding. Such a field context permits work with a non-student population.
The results indicated that the share of subjects making a contribution was higher when faced
with a higher share of others making a contribution. Shang and Croson (2005) conducted a field
experiment in an anonymous public radio station during the radio station’s on-air fund raising
campaign. The study was designed in such a way as to communicate to potential donors how
much a donor had given, and investigated the influence of this social information on the level of
contribution (“We had another member, they contributed $75, $180 or $300”, p. 8). The results
indicated that social information does influence contributions. Another natural field experiment
took place at an art gallery where admission was free, but where a donation could be placed in a
transparent box in the foyer (Martin and Randal 2005). Four treatments were investigated (very
few large denomination bills, several small denomination bills, a large number of coins and an
empty box). Contrary to the previously discussed studies, this one provided indirect information
on the social context, as donors could draw their own conclusions from the donation box. The
results show that visitors donate significantly more when there is already money in the box.
However, our discussion of the existing literature suggests that the question of whether,
and to what extent, individuals as taxpayers react to the behavior of other taxpayers, is still wide
open.
3. Theoretical approach
In contrast to most previous studies, this paper uses survey data provided by the
European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000. It is a European wide investigation of socio-cultural
and political change. The survey has assessed the basic values and beliefs of people all over
Europe. The EVS was first carried out in 1981-83, then in 1990-91 and again in 1999-2001, with
an increasing number of countries participating. The EVS methodological approach is explained
in detail in the European Values Survey source book, providing information on different aspects,
8such as response rates, stages of sampling procedures, translation of the questionnaire, field
work, data (e.g., measures of coding reliability, reliability and data checks) etc. (see European
Values 1999). All country surveys were carried out by experienced professional survey
organizations (with the exception of Greece) and were performed through face-to-face interviews
among samples of adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Tilburg University coordinated the
project and provided the guidelines, guaranteeing standardized information of the surveys and
the national representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions were mostly
asked in the prescribed order. The response rate varies from one country to another, showing, in
general, average values around 60%.
Because the EVS asks the identical set of questions in various European countries, the
survey gives us a unique opportunity to examine the impact of conditional cooperation on tax
morale. Our study considers 30 representative national samples of at least 1000 individuals per
country. Surveys allow us to work with a representative set of individuals, an aspect not often
seen in experimental studies. Many experiments are done with students as participants. The
problem with students is that they correspond to a subject pool with a higher level of education
and a higher IQ than average citizens. They often come from families with a higher than average
income and their age range is limited (Fehr et al. 2003). Considering the tax compliance context,
it can be argued that students do not have much experience in filling out tax forms. Thus, the
question is whether results obtained with students can be generalized across subject pools.
However, few studies investigate whether students form a satisfactory representative for studies
carried out on taxpayer behavior, and the results are mixed. On the one hand, Baldry (1987)
found that students’ responses are no different from those of other subjects when it comes to tax
compliance experiments. On the other hand, Gërxhani and Schram (2001), in their cross-country
experiments in The Netherlands and Albania, showed the importance of subject pools. In another
context, Frey and Meier (2004a) observed that people differ in their pro-social attitudes. The
9donation to funds strongly varies among students with different majors, controlling in a
multivariate analysis for other personal characteristics, such as age and gender.
Conditional cooperation also depends on environmental and institutional settings.
However, the effect of institutions on pro-social behavior has not been analyzed intensively.
Henrich et al. (2001) undertook a large cross-cultural study of behavior, using ultimatum, public
good, and dictator games. They found a large variation across the different cultural groups and
argued that preferences and/or expectations are affected by group-specific conditions, such as
institutions or cultural fairness norms. Surveys conducted in several countries, such as the EVS,
are a good instrument for investigating conditional cooperation in different societies. Our study
enables us to differentiate between Western and Eastern European countries. In general, surveys
may help to complement previous studies on conditional cooperation, which used laboratory
experiments.
Our dependent variable is tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. It
is the individuals’ willingness to pay taxes or, in other words, the moral obligation to pay taxes,
or the belief in contributing to society by paying taxes. To assess the level of tax morale from the
EVS, we used the following question:
“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be
justified, it can never be justified, or it falls somewhere in between: … Cheating on tax
payments if you get the chance”.
The question leads to a ten-scale index of tax morale, where the two extremes are “never
justified” and “always justified”. The scale has been recoded into a four-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3),
with the value 3 standing for “never justified”. The points 4-10 have been integrated into the
value 0 due to a lack of variance.
Many researchers have argued that tax morale helps to explain the high degree of tax
compliance (Lewis 1982, Pommerehne, Hart and Frey 1994, Frey 1997, 2003a, Alm, McClelland
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and Schulze 1992, 1999, Frey and Feld 2002, Torgler 2001a, 2002). However, many of the
studies treat tax morale as an exogenous residual. Using tax morale as a dependent variable
allows us to go beyond treating tax morale as a black box or a residuum, and thus analyze which
factors help shape, or maintain, tax morale. The EVS has the advantage that it has been designed
as a wide-ranging survey. This reduces the probability of participants being suspicious and of
creating framing effects with other contexts relevant for taxation. Of course, the measurement of
tax morale is not free of bias. Because the available data are based on self-reports, in which
subjects may tend to overstate their degree of compliance (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998),
no objective or observable measure of tax morale is available. Elffers, Weigel, and Hessing
(1987) found marked differences between the assessment of tax evasion and the reported tax
evasion in survey responses. Nonetheless, because the way we define tax morale is less
embarrassing than asking whether a person has evaded taxes, we expect the degree of honesty to
be higher. It can also be argued that a taxpayer who has evaded tax payments in the past will tend
to excuse this kind of behavior and report a higher tax morale in the survey. Furthermore, the
survey question to measure tax morale may make way for other forms of interpretation. For
example, an individual may think that cheating on taxes is justifiable in case he/she believes that
the government is not to be trusted. In countries where tax revenues are collected to finance a
“dictator’s war machine”, tax evasion might be justifiable, and there could even be a “moral
duty” not to pay taxes.  Similarly, in authoritarian political systems, people will search for
“voice” or “exit” mechanisms via tax resistance in order to express their preferences (Torgler
2001b).  In such cases, the statement for measuring tax morale would also capture external
factors. This suggests that it’s a good idea to use an index rather than a single question to
measure tax morale or tax compliance. Furthermore, it can be argued that tax morale is a
multidimensional concept that requires a multi-item measurement tool, and the likelihood of a
multi-item index being adversely affected by random errors will produce more reliable measures.
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Thus, we recognize that single-item measures should be treated with some caution. On the other
hand, the use of such a single question has the advantage of reducing problems of index
construction complexity, especially with regard to measurement procedure or low correlation
between items. Moreover, several previous studies have found consistent results, using single-
item survey measurements in line with our approach and laboratory experiments (e.g.,
Cummings et al. 2005, Alm and Torgler 2006). A further bias may arise when people ignore that
the tax morale question contains the clause “if you get the chance”, answering therefore on the
basis that they anyway never get the chance, because, for most people, income tax is usually
deducted at source by the employer. In general, the fact that the EVS has included the
hypothetical question allows to argue that the possibility of such a bias is less likely to occur if
the question does not include the clause “if you get the chance”, although it is difficult to be
completely sure. Furthermore, it can be argued that the independent variable self-employed
allows, to some extent, to control for the relative ease of tax evasion in the multivariate analysis.
The following question in the EVS allows us to investigate conditional cooperation:
“According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Cheat on taxes if
they get the chance?” (4=almost all, 1=almost none)
Lewis (1982, p. 144) pointed out already many years ago that there might be a
“tax subculture, with its own set of unwritten rules and regulations. Thus I am more likely to
evade not only because I have friends who, I know, have got away with it (so why shouldn’t I?)
but also because evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends (…) Furthermore, ‘no friends
of mine can be criminals’ (…) ‘What’s good enough for fine, upstanding citizens like Fred
Bloggs, John Doe, Donald Campbell, Herman Schmitt and Hans Anderson is good enough for
me’”.
On the basis of these considerations, we can derive the hypothesis that tax morale decreases if
people perceive that tax evasion is common. On the other hand, if people believe that others are
honest, their own willingness to pay taxes increases.
12
The correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale will be investigated in a
multivariate analysis, controlling for other factors to better isolate the relationship. A
specification based on a multivariate analysis has the obvious advantage of presenting a more
balanced view of the role of conditional cooperation, separating the effects of other exogenous
variables. If conditional cooperation differed systematically in another way that also affects tax
morale, the results could be misleading.
The question remains whether there is a causality problem. It might be argued that one’s
own willingness to pay taxes might lead to the expectation that others behave in the same way.
However, it is interesting to note that the results from strategy method experiments, that carefully
investigated the causality issue, suggest that causality goes from beliefs about others’ cheating to
one’s own behavior rather than vice versa (see Fischbacher et al. 2001, Fischbacher and Gächter
2006, Gächter 2006). In the empirical part, we also present 2SLS estimations with different
instruments and include several diagnostic tests to deal with the causality problem. In general,
the EVS is not a panel survey, and so a survey that follows individuals over time would have
allowed us to study the dynamics of adjustment better. Besides, the question referring to
conditional cooperation has only been asked in the last EVS wave of 1999-2001. Longitudinal
data would help reduce problems of unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, we test in
detail the relevance and validity of instruments and the overidentifying restrictions. Moreover, in
a further approach, we try to filter out a possible bias in our conditional cooperative effect. The
idea is to correct a possible systematic bias between what I think and what I project on others3.
This provides a possible way of correcting parts of such a potential bias. Thus, such a procedure
helps to better isolate the existence of a conditional cooperative effect.
                                                 
3 We are thankful to Francesc Pujol for providing us with the idea of filtering.
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Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables at the individual level,
covering demographic4, economic and religious variables5. Previous tax compliance studies have
shown the relevance of considering socio-demographic, socio-economic variables and proxies
for religiosity (for an overview, see Torgler 2003a, Torgler 2006). In the first estimations, we
don’t include income in our study. The ten-point income scale in the EVS is based on national
currencies, which reduces the possibility of comparing nations in a cross-country comparison6. A
proxy for the economic situation could be the self-classification of the respondents into the
various economic classes. However, the variable has not been collected in all countries. Thus, we
include the economic status sequentially in the specification. As will be seen, the main results
remain robust. In a second approach, we include at the end of the paper the income variable
based on national currencies in 30 single country regressions . Also here, the variable has been
included sequentially, due to the fact that the variable has a certain amount of variables missing.
Besides these control factors, we consider two variables that measure generalized trust
among taxpayers (TRUST17 and TRUST2 8). This allows to better isolate a possible conditional
cooperative effect. Furthermore, instead of focusing only on horizontal trust (trust among
taxpayers), we also include variables that measure vertical trust (trust between taxpayers and the
state). Trust in the state might be important in understanding the willingness to pay taxes, but is
not necessarily related to conditional cooperation among the citizens. Positive actions by the
state are intended to increase taxpayers’ positive attitudes and their commitment to the tax
system and thus to compliant behavior (Smith 1992, Smith and Stalans 1991).  If the state acts in
                                                 
4 Variables such as age, gender or education. Proxy for education: At what age did you complete or will you
complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude
apprenticeships.
5 Question: Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days?
More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special religious days, once a year, less often,
practically never or never. (8=more than once a week to 1=practically never or never)
6 A further disadvantage is the fact that income has been coded as a scale from 1 to 10 (income intervals). Thus,
scale systems are not fully comparable among countries.
7 Could you tell me how much you trust [own country, e.g., British] people in general? (5=Trust them completely,
4=trust them a little, 3=Neither trust nor distrust them, 2=Do not trust them very much, 1=Do not trust them at all).
8 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in your dealings
with people? (1=most people can be trusted, 0=can’t be too careful).
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a trustworthy way, then taxpayers might be more willing to comply with the taxes9. We use two
trust variables, TRUST IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM10 and TRUST IN PARLIAMENT 11, to
check the robustness of the trust variables.  These variables allow us to analyze trust at the
constitutional level (e.g., trust in the legal system), thereby focusing on how the relationship
between the state and its citizens is established; they also allow us to analyze trust more closely
at the current politico-economic level (e.g., trust in parliament). We also analyze whether
individuals’ satisfaction with the way democracy is developing in a country (SATISFACTION
WITH DEMOCRACY12), has an impact on tax morale. In general, a government that commits
itself ahead of time with democratic rules imposes restraints on its own power and thus sends out
a signal that taxpayers are treated as responsible persons. Strong democratic rules signal that
citizens are not ignorant or uncomprehending voters, which might create or maintain a certain
social capital stock. If taxpayers feel they are in a better position to monitor and control
politicians, their willingness to cooperate and pay taxes increases. It can therefore be supposed
that a higher degree of satisfaction with a country’s democratic institution leads to a higher tax
morale. Previous studies show that more extensive possibilities for direct political participation
lead to lower tax evasion and higher intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (see Pommerehne and
Weck-Hannemann 1996, Frey 1997, 2003a, Alm, McClelland and Schulze 1999, Frey and Feld
2002, Feld and Tyran 2002 and Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner 2003, and Torgler 2005).
This paper differentiates between Western and Eastern Europe. The reform process in the
transition countries caused disorientation and a heavy economic burden (see Kasper and Streit
1999 and Gërxhani 2002). The rapid collapse of institutional structures produced a vacuum in
                                                 
9 Frey and Feld (2002), using Swiss data, make the empirical finding that a respectful treatment of taxpayers by the
tax administration reduces tax evasion.
10 Question: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the justice system: Do you have a great deal of
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of
confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
11 Question: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in parliament: Do you have a great deal of
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of
confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
12 Question: On the whole, are you very satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the
way democracy is developing in our country? (4=very satisfied, 1=not at all satisfied).
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many countries, followed by large social costs, especially in terms of worsening income
inequality and poverty rates and bad institutional conditions, based on uncertainty and high
transaction costs. Difficult policy choices had to be faced in this new era in such areas as the role
of the public sector in general and the structure of the tax system in particular (Alm, Martinez-
Vazquez and Torgler 2005). Furthermore, at the beginning of the transition process, citizens in
many transition countries were not used to paying taxes (see, e.g., Kornai 1990, Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab 2000). Thus, taxpayers may have reacted strongly to tax policy changes
necessary for the transition from a centrally controlled economy to a market economy. Torgler
(2003b) and Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2005) showed that these circumstances have
an impact on tax morale. We therefore expect that residents of Eastern European countries will,
other things being equal, exhibit a lower TAX MORALE than residents of the Western European
countries. However, country dummy variables also allow us to see whether there are differences
between Central Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries. It can be argued that
Central and Eastern European countries’ have made property rights more secure, as the transition
process came earlier and more rapidly, thus reducing individuals’ uncertainty and guaranteeing a
better transition process with more stable institutions. Reforms have progressed much faster in
CEE countries than in FSU countries (see, e.g., Campos and Coricelli 2002). In countries
negotiating their accession to the European Union, such as Poland, Romania, and Slovenia, the
accession intention has acted as a catalyst for a rapid tax reform move shaped along western lines
(see Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000). FSU countries have possibly been stimulated by the
collapse of communism and are more strongly involved with the economic crisis. As a
consequence, we predict a significantly lower tax morale in FSU economies than in CEE
economies. Table 1 reports the institutional quality of CEE and FSU countries, using six proxies
of the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004). The
variables measure the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced (voice
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and accountability, political stability and absence of violence), the capacity of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies (government effectiveness, regulatory quality) and the
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
(rule of law and control of corruption). All scores estimated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2004) lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better institutions
(outcomes). Table 1 indicates a higher institutional quality in CEE countries compared to FSU
countries. Moreover, the last column shows that the shadow economy of CEE countries is
smaller in size than that of FSU countries. A large shadow economy reduces the state’s tax
collection, thus affecting the revenues governments need to provide public goods and to build
trustworthy institutions. The incentive for enterprises to evade taxes increases and more bribes
are paid in exchange for a promise of protection (see Levin and Satarov 2000).
The question remains whether further factors should be included in the estimations.
Traditional tax evasion models suggest the relevance of deterrence variables. However, we aren’t
testing a model of tax evasion but a model of tax morale. Thus, it isn’t so obvious that we should
consider deterrence factors in our main model. Only if tax morale is seen as a good indicator of
tax compliance might one suggest incorporating deterrence factors into the model. Several
previous case studies show that deterrence factors are less likely to affect tax morale (see, e.g.,
Torgler 2005). The perceived deterrence factors may determine tax morale to a much greater
extent than the objective measurable factors used in this paper. Scholz and Pinney (1995), for
example, find support in their study for the idea that the subjective risk of getting caught is more
closely related to a sense of duty than to objective risk factors. However, we are not able to
collect this information in our study EVS.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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In our empirical analysis, we also investigate the impact of institutions on tax morale, using six
proxies for institutional quality. If taxpayers perceive that their interests (preferences) are
properly represented in political institutions, and they receive an increased supply of public
goods, their willingness to contribute increases.  On the other hand, in a state where corruption is
rampant, citizens have little incentive to cooperate.  A more encompassing and legitimate state
may be an essential precondition for a higher level of tax morale. Our results demonstrate that
the quality of political institutions has a strong observable impact on tax morale.
4. Econometric results
In general, in our case, an ordered probit model ranking information of the scaled
dependent variable tax morale is appropriate.  To measure the quantitative effect of a variable on
tax morale, the marginal effects are calculated, as the equation has a nonlinear form. The
marginal effect indicates the change in the percentage of taxpayers (or the probability of) having
a specific tax morale level, when the independent variable increases by one unit. For simplicity,
the marginal effects in all estimates are only presented for the highest tax morale value. Weighted
ordered probit estimates are conducted in order to correct the samples and thus to get a reflection
of the national distribution13. Furthermore, it should be noted that answers, such as “don’t
know”, and missing values have been eliminated in all estimations.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients first using two different estimation techniques
to identify the effect of the determinants discussed above on tax morale. Equation (1) uses robust
standard errors while equation (2) uses standard errors adjusted for the clustering on 30
countries, thus taking into account unobservable country specific characteristics. Clustering leads
to a decrease in the z-values, but has no impact on the marginal effects. The last two columns
report 2SLS estimations. As already mentioned above, recent laboratory experiments have
                                                 
13 The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.
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shown that causality goes from beliefs about others’ cheating to one’s own behavior rather than
vice versa. The Hausman specification test indicates that the hypothesis of an inconsistent
estimator for the equation cannot be rejected. However, the Hausman test is based on the
assumption that the instruments are valid. Therefore, Table 2 reports two 2SLS estimations,
together with several diagnostic tests. To check for robustness, two different 2SLS estimations
are used. In the first one, perceived cash payments to avoid taxes is employed as an instrument14.
In the second one, perceived bribing is included as an instrument15. Table 2 also reports the
results of an Anderson canonical correlation LR for whether the equation is identified as a
measure of instrument relevance. The test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected,
indicating that, in all cases, the model is identified and the instruments are relevant. Table 2
further shows that the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression are
statistically significant in all cases. In addition, a test for the validity of the instruments is
applied, using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Table 2 indicates that the null
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are not correlated with the error term, and therefore are
correctly excluded from the equation, cannot be rejected. Thus, the results indicate the presence
of valid instruments.
The estimation results most importantly suggest that the higher the perceived tax evasion
of other persons, the lower the tax morale. This is consistent with our main hypothesis of tax
morale decreasing if people perceive that tax evasion is a common phenomenon. The size of the
effect is substantial: when perceived tax evasion rises by one unit, the percentage of persons
reporting a high tax morale falls by 7.4 percentage points (see first estimation). In addition, the
coefficient PERCEIVED TAX EVASION remains statistically significant for both 2SLS.
                                                 
14 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Pay cash for services to avoid taxes?
(4=almost all, 1=almost none)
15 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Accept a bribe in the course of their duties?
(4=almost all, 1=almost none)
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The estimated coefficient for WESTERN EUROPE suggests that the institutional crisis in
many transition countries in Eastern Europe, after the collapse of communism, tended to
negatively affect the tax morale of the citizens living there. The marginal effects in eq. (1)
indicate that being a Western European, rather than an Eastern European, increases the
probability of stating that tax evasion is never justified by 3.5 percentage points.
According to the control variables, older people and women exhibit higher tax morale.
Education negatively affects tax morale, without being statistically significant in two out of four
estimations. Divorced and separated persons have the lowest tax morale, perhaps because they
have become more cynical, or perhaps because persons who are cynical by nature are more likely
to end up being divorced. Self-employed persons have lower tax morale while church attendance
is correlated with higher tax morale.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Instead of constructing a dummy variable that differentiates between Western and Eastern
Europe, it might be interesting to take a closer look at differences between particular countries.
Table 3 includes country dummies in the estimation equation, using GERMANY as a reference.
The coefficient of the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION remains highly statistically
significant with an increase in the marginal effects. The control variables are in line with the
estimates reported in Table 2 and are therefore not explicitly reported. Among the Western
European countries, Belgium exhibits the biggest negative difference compared to Germany,
with marginal effects of around 20 percentage points. Malta has the highest tax morale of all
countries. It is interesting to note that the Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, Hungary,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Poland exhibit higher tax morale than
Germany. The coefficient of the first four countries is statistically significant. Table 3 also
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reveals that Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries, such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania,
Estonia or Latvia, have lower tax morale than Central Eastern European (CEE) countries. It
seems that CEE countries have been more successful than FSU countries at designing tax
systems, tax administrations, and government structures in which taxpayers can place their trust.
Such institutional improvements and observable changes may help to explain the high
willingness to cooperate, showing, in some cases, even higher tax morale values than for some of
the Western European countries. In the second estimation in Table 3, proxies for the economic
situation of the individuals are included. As can be seen, the coefficient PERCEIVED TAX
EVASION remains highly statistical significant with similar marginal effects (10.8 percentage
points in estimation 6 compared to 9.7 in estimation 5). On the other hand, the coefficients
UPPER CLASS and MIDDLE CLASS are not statistically significant.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 investigates whether institutional quality matters. As it may be argued that including
aggregated country variables produces downwardly biased standard errors, the problem of
heteroscedasticity is addressed by presenting standard errors adjusted for clustering on cantons in
the last six estimations (see eq. 7b –12b). As can be seen in all 12 estimations, the coefficients of
the institutional variables have a statistically significant positive effect on tax morale. The
strongest quantitative effects are observable for the variables VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL STABILITY and REGULATORY QUALITY. The
coefficient PERCEIVED TAX EVASION remains statistically significant with high marginal
effects.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
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In Table 5, the first two estimations try to better isolate a possible conditional cooperative
effect. Thus, two proxies, namely TRUST1 and TRUST2, measuring the level of trust among
taxpayers, are included. This allows us to see whether conditional cooperation may be driven by
higher generalized trust. The first trust variable is statistically significant with a positive sign, but
covers only a limited number of countries. On the other hand, the second trust variable is not
statistically significant and even shows a negative sign. The PERCEIVED TAX EVASION
variable is statistically significant in all estimations, with marginal effects between 7.4 and 10.9
percentage points. The next step includes two variables that measure the impact of trust in the
state. The results indicate that the variables have a statistically significant positive effect on tax
morale. An increase in trust in the justice system or in parliament by one unit raises the
percentage of persons indicating the highest tax morale by more than 3 percentage points. A
further estimation shows that an increase in individuals’ satisfaction with the way democracy is
developing by one unit raises the proportion of persons stating that tax evasion is never justified
by 1.5 percentage points. The trust and democracy variables generally show the relevance of
institutions that enhance political participation and trust in parliament and the justice system.
Such institutions have beneficial effects on social capital and the political outcome, not only in
Western Europe, but also in Eastern Europe (see Frey 2003b). Introducing these variables does
not affect the size and the significance of the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION. The
marginal effects are still between 7.1 and 7.7 percentage points and the coefficient is highly
statistically significant. Thus, the effect of conditional cooperation remains robust.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
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It may be argued that the observed effect of conditional cooperation may be driven by
one of the two regions (Eastern or Western Europe). To test the robustness of conditional
cooperation, it is worthwhile to investigate the two regions independently, using the
specifications presented previously.  The conditional cooperative effect is stronger in Western
Europe, but the coefficient for Eastern Europe stays statistically significant. An increase in the
perceived tax evasion scale by one unit reduces the percentage of persons stating that tax evasion
is never justified by around 10 percentage points in Western Europe and more than 4 percentage
points in Eastern Europe. These results suggest that conditional cooperation is not driven by the
results of Western Europe. The trust and democracy variables are statistically significant in both
regions, but the marginal effects indicate that they have a stronger impact on tax morale in
Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. The estimated coefficients for the trust and democracy
variables point to the importance of involving the taxpayers in the decision process in order to
maintain or improve tax morale. Social capital is both a precondition and consequence of a
higher political participation.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
To deal with the causality problem, a possible bias in the conditional cooperative effect is
filtered out. The idea is to correct a possible systematic bias between what I think and what I
project on others. Thus, the causality problem arises, because my willingness to pay taxes might
lead to the expectation that others behave in the same way. Thus, individuals with a higher tax
morale have a lower perception that others cheat on taxes. How is it possible to estimate such a
bias? To deal with this problem, we calculate the average PERCEIVED TAX EVASION for
each country. In the next step, we calculate the average PERCEIVED TAX EVASION in each
country for the individuals with the highest tax morale, stressing that cheating on taxes is never
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justifiable. In a further step, we build on the difference between both average values (value has a
positive sign). This variable may catch a certain bias in the variable PERCEIVED TAX
EVASION due to the level of tax morale. In a last step, we add such a possible bias to the
individual values of the group with the highest tax morale. As a consequence, each of the
individuals with the highest tax morale now has a higher PERCEIVED TAX EVASION,
bringing the values between the group with higher and lower tax morale closer together,
depending on the perceived tax evasion situation in each country. Thus, such a procedure may
help to better isolate the existence of a conditional cooperative effect. Table 7 presents results,
using the filtered PERCEIVED TAX EVASION variable on 14 different specifications. As can
be seen, the coefficients remain highly statistically significant. The marginal effects have
decreased, but are still very high.
Finally, we test whether the large impact of the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION
on tax morale is driven by a subset of countries. The results are presented in Table 8. First, we
use the specification derived in eq. (1) and estimate it separately for each country in our sample.
The results of the 30 regressions are presented in the first result column. This allows us to get a
robust picture of pro-social behavior in the countries under investigation. For simplicity, only the
coefficient for the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION is reported. In 27 of the 30 countries,
the coefficients are highly statistically significant with a negative sign (exceptions are Portugal,
Romania and the Slovak Republic). The estimates reveal higher marginal effects for Western
European countries than for Eastern European countries. In 11 out of 16 cases, the marginal
effects exceed 10 percentage points in Western Europe, compared to only 3 out of 14 cases in
Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence of conditional cooperation in most
European countries. The more individuals expect that others will cooperate, the higher is the
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. The second group of estimations is presented in the second
result column. A ten-point scale income variable (in national currency) is included. As can be
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seen, the results remain robust. A next step conducts 30 2SLS estimations. Again, the impact of
the PERCEIVED TAX EVASION remains valid. The statistical significance tends to decrease,
but the coefficient is still significant with a negative sign in 24 out of 30 countries. The last
column uses the filtered perceived tax evasion variable. Again, the z-statistics decrease. But, in
line with the previous columns, the conditional cooperative is still very strong and valid in 72
percent of the cases.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper proposes that taxation is a social act and that conditional cooperation is an
important factor, explaining the extent of tax morale and tax evasion. An individual taxpayer is
strongly influenced by what he or she perceives to be the behavior of other taxpayers. If
taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, their tax morale decreases; if they believe others to
be honest, their tax morale increases. Recent data for Western and Eastern European countries
are in line with these hypotheses. The size of the effect is substantial. The results remain robust
after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. The econometric estimates
also suggest that the institutional crisis, which took place in many transition countries after the
collapse of communism, negatively affected the tax morale of their citizens. Within Eastern
Europe, the taxpayers in countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU, including Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia or Latvia) exhibit a lower tax morale than those in Central Eastern
European countries (CEE, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovenian Republic,
Bulgaria, Croatia and Poland). Our results also show that the quality of political institutions has a
strong observable effect on tax morale. All six variables (voice and accountability, political
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption) have a strong impact on tax morale.
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Our analysis tries to go one step further than the standard economic theory of tax evasion,
based on a narrow concept of Homo Oeconomicus acting in isolation. The concept of tax morale
has been introduced to build a bridge between the perception individual taxpayers have about the
behavior of other taxpayers, and their personal decision on whether, and to what extent, to evade
their own taxes, and stressing the importance of institutions. As has been shown in various
empirical studies, tax morale is a crucial determinant of taxpaying behavior, but in most studies
so far, it has been treated as an exogenous factor. The determinants of tax morale introduced in
this paper, in particular the concept of conditional cooperation and institutions, help us to gain a
better understanding of the considerations underlying tax-paying and tax evasion.
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TABLES
Table 1
Institutional Quality in Former Soviet Union and Eastern European Countries
Aggregate Governance Indicators 1998a Former Soviet
Union and
Eastern European
Countries
Voice and
Accountability
Political
Stability
Government
Effectiveness
Regulatory
Quality
Rule of Law
 
Control of
Corruption
Shadow
Economyb in
%
of GDP (1999)
Belarus -0.98 -0.15 -0.83 -2.01 -1.08 -0.60 48.1
Bulgaria 0.40 0.44 -0.94 0.47 -0.22 -0.50 36.9
Croatia -0.30 0.46 0.30 0.34 -0.04 0.04 33.4
Czech Republic 1.14 0.97 0.72 0.78 0.62 0.35 19.1
Estonia 0.82 0.95 0.45 1.06 0.54 0.49 38.40
Greece 0.92 0.38 0.78 0.83 0.66 0.85 28.70
Hungary 1.15 1.19 0.78 1.15 0.78 0.69 25.10
Latvia 0.72 0.54 0.19 0.72 0.08 -0.10 39.90
Lithuania 0.84 0.54 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.07 30.30
Poland 1.01 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.57 0.49 27.60
Romania 0.24 0.20 -0.61 0.30 -0.25 -0.38 34.40
Russia -0.26 -0.62 -0.62 -0.37 -0.78 -0.69 46.10
Slovakian Republic 0.45 0.95 0.08 0.29 0.13 -0.08 18.90
Ukraine -0.14 -0.19 -0.97 -0.89 -0.76 -0.89 52.20
Notes: a Kaufmann et al. (2004). Values between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better
institutions (outcomes).  b Schneider (2004, p. 24), using the DYMIMIC and Currency Demand Method.
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Table 2: Determinants of Tax Morale in Europe
 Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Coeff. z-Stat.
  Effects Effects    
  WEIGHTED ORDERED
PROBIT
WEIGHTED ORDERED
PROBIT
WEIGHTED 2SLSa WEIGHTED 2SLSb
Robust standard  errors Standard errors adjusted for   
  clustering on countries   
INDEPENDENT V.
 Eq. 1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4
PERCEIVED TAX
EVASION
-0.186*** -18.11 -0.074 -0.186*** -4.71 -0.074 -0.159*** -8.69 -0.299*** -10.8
CONTROL VARIABLES      
(1) Demographic Factors      
AGE 30-39 0.099*** 3.89 0.039 0.099*** 2.65 0.039 0.102*** 3.54 0.204*** 5.09
AGE 40-49 0.216*** 7.97 0.085 0.216*** 5.22 0.085 0.235*** 7.77 0.350*** 8.27
AGE 50-59 0.298*** 10.15 0.116 0.298*** 6.18 0.116 0.328*** 10.20 0.427*** 9.4
AGE 60-69 0.318*** 8.63 0.124 0.318*** 4.86 0.124 0.341*** 8.76 0.448*** 8.14
AGE 70+ 0.446*** 10.34 0.171 0.446*** 5.74 0.171 0.451*** 10.41 0.504*** 7.97
WOMAN 0.123*** 7.8 0.049 0.123*** 6.02 0.049 0.143*** 8.34 0.125*** 5.17
EDUCATION -0.004** -2.53 -0.001 -0.004 -1.04 -0.001 -0.003** -2.09 0.002 0.72
(2) Marital Status      
WIDOWED -0.048 -1.59 -0.019 -0.048 -1.64 -0.019 -0.063** -2.12 -0.031 -0.74
DIVORCED -0.174*** -6.2 -0.069 -0.174*** -5.23 -0.069 -0.197*** -6.30 -0.195*** -4.66
SEPARATED -0.187*** -3.43 -0.075 -0.187*** -3.93 -0.075 -0.174*** -2.86 -0.213** -2.2
NEVER MARRIED -0.084*** -3.74 -0.034 -0.084** -2.16 -0.034 -0.098*** -3.91 -0.052 -1.46
(3) Employment Status      
PART TIME EMPLOYED -0.083*** -2.94 -0.033 -0.083** -2.25 -0.033 -0.082** -2.58 -0.042 -0.97
SELFEMPLOYED -0.106*** -3.29 -0.042 -0.106** -2.34 -0.042 -0.118*** -3.25 -0.084* -1.73
UNEMPLOYED 0.131*** 4.32 0.052 0.131*** 2.9 0.052 0.135*** 4.42 0.157*** 3.56
AT HOME 0.019 0.64 0.008 0.019 0.37 0.008 0.004 0.12 -0.014 -0.28
STUDENT -0.055 -1.51 -0.022 -0.055 -1.13 -0.022 -0.063 -1.49 -0.052 -0.85
RETIRED -0.091*** -3.07 -0.036 -0.091** -2.24 -0.036 -0.104*** -3.07 -0.183*** -3.88
OTHER 0.083 1.5 0.033 0.083 1.39 0.033 0.080 1.32 0.189** 2.23
(4) Religiosity      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 0.041*** 13.59 0.016 0.041*** 3.63 0.016 0.045*** 13.96 0.031*** 6.52
(5) Culture/Regions      
WESTERN EUROPE 0.089*** 6.00 0.035 0.089 0.86 0.035 0.097*** 5.93 0.148*** 6.46
F-test for excluded IVs     11019***   3025***  
Anderson canon. corr. LR
statistic
    14000***   7263***  
Hansen J statistic                0.485  
Pseudo R2 0.029   0.029      
Centered R2     0.066   0.08  
Number of observations 32610   32610   30984   16413  
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F 0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000  
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED,
FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, EASTERN EUROPE. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Marginal effect = high tax morale score (3). a Instrument: perceived cash payments to avoid taxes. b Instruments: perceived
cash payments and bribes. Missing countries: France, Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Hungary,
Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Malta.
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Table 3
Tax Morale Among Different Countries
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
  Effects Effects
INDEPENDENT V. Eq. 5   Eq. 6   
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.243*** -21.92 -0.097 -0.276*** -17.10 -0.108
ECONOMIC SITUATION   
UPPER CLASS  -0.048 -1.45 0.001
MIDDLE CLASS  -0.028 -1.12 -0.019
COUNTRIES    
Western European Countries    
Germany ref. group   ref. group  
Austria 0.083* 1.65 0.033 0.083 0.032 1.62
Belgium -0.530*** -11 -0.206 -0.551*** -10.93 -0.217
Great Britain 0.002 0.04 0.001 0.019 0.33 0.008
Denmark 0.246*** 4.63 0.096  
Finland -0.048 -0.87 -0.019  
France -0.288*** -5.83 -0.114 -0.297*** -5.82 -0.118
Iceland 0.185*** 3.41 0.073
Ireland 0.072 1.22 0.028
Italy 0.099** 2.16 0.039 0.107** 2.23 0.042
Malta 0.737*** 12.38 0.264 0.741*** 11.96 0.257
Netherlands -0.251*** -4.76 -0.1
North Ireland 0.026 0.41 0.01  
Portugal 0.044 0.65 0.017  
Spain -0.124** -2.38 -0.049 -0.136** -2.54 -0.054
Sweden -0.067 -1.15 -0.027 -0.074 -1.15 -0.029
Eastern European Countries    
Belarus -0.835*** -14.76 -0.308  
Bulgaria 0.217*** 3.69 0.085  
Croatia 0.065 0.9 0.026 0.052 0.70 0.020
Czech Republic 0.189*** 4.06 0.074 0.187*** 3.91 0.072
Estonia -0.409*** -7.66 -0.161  
Greece -0.200*** -3.84 -0.08  
Hungary 0.536*** 8.65 0.2 0.558*** 8.72 0.202
Latvia -0.018 -0.32 -0.007  
Lithuania -0.592*** -8.79 -0.228  
Poland 0.083 1.47 0.033 0.070 1.19 0.027
Romania -0.011 -0.2 -0.004  
Russia -0.272*** -6.1 -0.108  
Slovakian Republic 0.115** 2.27 0.045 0.111** 2.13 0.043
Ukraine -0.473*** -8.94 -0.185  
ALL OTHER VARIABLES INCLUDED    
Number of observations 32610  16760  
Prob > chi2 0.000     0.000    
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN,
MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED, GERMANY, LOWEST CLASS.  Significance levels: * 0.05 <
p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).
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Table 4
Tax Morale and Institutional Quality
WEIGHTED ORDERED
PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
    Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects   Effects
INDEPENDENT V.  Eq. 7a    Eq. 8a   Eq.9a   Eq. 10a   Eq. 11a   Eq. 12a   
                                     
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.193*** -18.62 -0.077 -0.192*** -18.57 -0.076 -0.184*** -17.76 -0.073 -0.190*** -18.38 -0.076 -0.186*** -17.93 -0.074 -0.185*** -17.87 -0.074
GOVERNANCE
Voice and Accountability 0.189*** 15.99 0.075                
Political Stability    0.221*** 18.75 0.088             
Government Effectiveness       0.079*** 10.80 0.031          
Regulatory Quality          0.160*** 14.97 0.064       
Rule of Law             0.093*** 12.03 0.037    
Control of Corruption                0.061*** 9.20 0.024
OTHER VAR. INCLUDED                   
Pseudo R2 0.033     0.034     0.030     0.032     0.031     0.030    
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
clustering on countries  Eq. 7b    Eq. 8b   Eq.9b   Eq. 10b   Eq. 11b   Eq. 12b    
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.193*** -5.25 -0.077 -0.192*** -5.49 -0.076 -0.184*** -4.73 -0.073 -0.190*** -5.23 -0.076 -0.186*** -4.80 -0.074 -0.185*** -4.78 -0.074
GOVERNANCE
Voice and Accountability 0.189** 2.59 0.075                
Political Stability    0.221** 3.27 0.088             
Government Effectiveness       0.079* 1.77 0.031          
Regulatory Quality          0.160*** 2.63 0.064       
Rule of Law             0.093** 2.12 0.037    
Control of Corruption                0.061* 1.69 0.024
OTHER VAR. INCLUDED                
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, **
0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = high tax morale score (3).
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Table 5
Generalized Trust and Trust in the State
                
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
  Effects Effects   Effects Effects Effects
INDEPENDENT V. Eq. 13   Eq. 13   Eq. 14   Eq. 15   Eq. 16   
           
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.275*** -21.51 -0.109 -0.187*** -4.74 -0.074 -0.178*** -4.59 -0.071 -0.179*** -4.65 -0.071 -0.187*** -4.77 -0.074
Trust and Democracy          
TRUST1a 0.067*** 4.37 0.027       
TRUST2  -0.037 -1.23 -0.015      
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM     0.082*** 4.51 0.033    
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT       0.094*** 4.79 0.037  
SAT. WITH DEMOCRACY        0.039** 2.42 0.015
ALL OTHER VARIABLES INCLUDED          
           
Number of observations 8352   31444   30915   31371   30915  
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYED,
EASTERN EUROPE.  Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).a  The
variable trust has not been collected in France, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Hungary, Sweden, Iceland, Finland,
Poland, Belarus, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Russia, Croatia, Slovakia, Greece, and Malta. Standard
errors adjusted for clustering on countries.
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Table 6
Determinants of Tax Morale in Western and Eastern Europe
          
WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
Effects Effects Effects
INDEPENDENT V.       
WESTERN EUROPE Eq. 17a   Eq. 18a   Eq. 19a   
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.252*** -5.430 -0.100 -0.239*** -5.240 -0.095 -0.241*** -5.450 -0.095
(6) Trust and Democracy
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
0.120*** 5.240 0.048
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT 0.124*** 4.960 0.049
SATISFACTION WITH
DEMOCRACY
ALL OTHER V. INCLUDED
Number of observations 17807 17415 17244
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000   
EASTERN EUROPE Eq. 17b   Eq. 18b   Eq. 19b   
PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.116** -2.240 -0.046 -0.112** -2.160 -0.045 -0.110** -2.140 -0.044
(6) Trust and Democracy
TRUST IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM
0.063** 2.390 0.025
TRUST IN THE PARLIAMENT 0.040** 1.970 0.016
SATISFACTION WITH
DEMOCRACY
ALL OTHER V. INCLUDED
Number of observations 14803 14187 14127
Prob > chi2 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED,
FULL-TIME EMPLOYED.  Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect =
highest tax morale score (3). Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries.
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Table 7
Estimations with a Filtered Perceived Tax Evasion Variable
WEIGHTED ORDERED    
PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg.
DEPEND. V.: TAX MORALE  Effects
INDEPENDENT V. (ALL OTHERS CONTROLLED)    
ESTIMATION  TOTAL DATA SET  
WEST EUROPE (WE) DUMMY VAR.
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.108*** -10.09 -0.041
CLUSTERING ON COUNTRIES  
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.108*** -3.66 -0.043
COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES  
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.168*** -10.37 -0.067
WE DUMMY VAR., INCL. ECONOMIC STATUS  
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.118*** -8.12 -0.047
CLUST. ON C., INCL. EC. STATUS
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.107** -2.49 -0.042
COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES, INCLUDE EC. STATUS
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.171*** -10.66 -0.067
WE DUMMY VAR., INCL. TRUST2
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.104*** -9.86 -0.041
INCL. TRUST2, CLUSTERING ON COUNTRIES
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.107*** -3.66 -0.043
ESTIMATION ONLY WEST EUROPE  
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.152*** -10.38 -0.060
INCL. COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES  
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.174*** -11.20 -0.069
INCLUDING TRUST 2
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.154*** -10.29 -0.061
ESTIMATION EAST EUROPE
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.051*** -3.55 -0.02
INCL. COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -0.150*** -5.26 -0.058
INCLUDING TRUST2
FILTERED PERCEIVED TAX EVASION -.0105*** -6.71 -0.042
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).
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Table 8
Conditional Cooperation in the Evaluated Countries
WEIGHTED
ORDERED
PROBIT Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Marg. Coeff. z-Stat. Coeff. z-Stat. z-Stat.
 Effects Effects    
CONDITIONAL
COOPERATION
WEIGHTED ORDERED
PROBIT ESTIMATIONS
WEIGHTED ORDERED
PROBIT ESTIMATIONSa
WEIGHTED
2SLS ESTIMAT. b
WEIGHTED ORDERED
PROBIT ESTIMATIONS
VARIABLE:
PERCEIVED
TAX EVASION
 
 
 
Income  included
 
 
 
Filtered perceived tax
evasion
 
COUNTRIES      
Western European Countries      
Germany -0.330*** -6.47 -0.129 -0.450*** -7.66 -0.178 -0.154* -1.8 -0.192*** -3.82 -0.075
Austria -0.290*** -4.22 -0.113 -0.241*** -3.22 -0.095 -0.611*** -3.94 -0.178*** -2.62 -0.069
Belgium -0.406*** -9.36 -0.152 -0.413*** -8.57 -0.156 -0.587*** -6.77 -0.199*** -4.61 -0.075
Great Britain -0.346*** -3.75 -0.136 -0.360*** -3.27 -0.139 -0.433*** -3.27 -0.251*** -2.69 -0.099
Denmark -0.479*** -7.72 -0.174 -0.499*** -7.74 -0.182 -0.519*** -5.02 -0.349*** -5.60 -0.127
Finland -0.318*** -4.48 -0.126 -0.300*** -4.01 -0.119 -0.345*** -2.87 -0.177** -2.51 -0.070
France -0.211*** -4.35 -0.084 -0.206*** -3.79 -0.082 -0.330*** -3.47 -0.116** -2.40 -0.046
Iceland -0.250*** -3.37 -0.098 -0.267*** -3.4 -0.105 -0.294*** -3.22 -0.145** -2.00 -0.057
Ireland -0.373*** -5.63 -0.145 -0.380*** -5.33 -0.148 -0.441*** -3.92 -0.242*** -3.62 -0.094
Italy -0.303*** -6.47 -0.119 -0.394*** -7.14 -0.155 -0.490*** -5.65 -0.191*** -4.12 -0.075
Malta -0.587*** -5.2 -0.154 -0.600*** -4.56 -0.147 -0.218 -1.63 -0.485*** -4.38 -0.126
Netherlands -0.480*** -7.47 -0.19 -0.516*** -7.81 -0.204 -0.363** -2.48 -0.295*** -4.67 -0.117
North Ireland -0.150* -1.96 -0.058 -0.236*** -2.8 -0.092 -0.346*** -2.6 -0.064 -0.83 -0.025
Portugal 0.162** 2.12 0.064  0.699*** 5.14 0.129* 1.69 0.051
Spain -0.086* -1.68 -0.034 -0.085 -1.4 -0.033 -0.052 -0.59 -0.052 -1.02 -0.021
Sweden -0.395*** -5.28 -0.157 -0.392*** -5.21 -0.156 -0.617*** -3.96 -0.255*** -3.39 -0.101
Eastern European Countries      
Belarus -0.235*** -4.59 -0.074 -0.233*** -4.53 -0.073 -0.212*** -2.74 -0.119** -2.31 -0.037
Bulgaria -0.167** -2.32 -0.061 -0.163** -2.19 -0.06 -0.154 -1.45 -0.095 -1.33 -0.035
Croatia -0.385*** -4.33 -0.145 -0.376*** -4.12 -0.14 -0.402*** -3.02 -0.211** -2.36 -0.080
Czech Republic -0.282*** -5.74 -0.109 -0.272*** -5.29 -0.106 -0.373*** -4.22 -0.184*** -3.73 -0.071
Estonia -0.196*** -3.46 -0.075 -0.156** -2.56 -0.061 -0.251*** -3.02 -0.109* -1.94 -0.042
Greece -0.114** -2.08 -0.043 -0.09 -1.55 -0.034 -0.091 -0.52 -0.049 -0.90 -0.019
Hungary -0.236** -2.43 -0.085 -0.246** -2.51 -0.088 -0.200* -1.8 -0.163* -1.73 -0.059
Latvia -0.101** -1.99 -0.04 -0.116** -2.19 -0.045 -0.114* -1.77 -0.048 -0.95 -0.019
Lithuania -0.267*** -3.7 -0.1 -0.223*** -2.92 -0.086 -0.314*** -3.08 -0.140* -1.92 -0.053
Poland -0.294*** -4.11 -0.114 -0.297*** -4.08 -0.116 -0.523* -1.9 -0.219 -3.04 -0.085
Romania 0.059 0.83 0.023 0.059 0.8 0.023 0.394** 2.23 0.042 0.59 0.016
Russia -0.188*** -4.6 -0.074 -0.168*** -4.01 -0.066 -0.321*** -4.38 -0.088** -2.16 -0.035
Slovak Republic -0.009 -0.18 -0.003 -0.019 -0.37 -0.007 -0.173** -2.08 -0.019 -0.40 -0.007
Ukraine -0.227*** -3.67 -0.075 -0.243*** -3.91 -0.093 -0.012 -0.1 -0.107* -1.73 -0.041
Notes: Robust standard errors. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal
effect = highest tax morale score (3). The first specification is based on eq. (1), considering each country value for
the coefficient of the variable PERCEIVED TAX EVASION. The second one includes the income variable (scale
from 1 to 10, national currency). a No income information in Portugal. b Instrument in all estimations: perceived
cash payments.
